Research
Rationality of Science and the Demarcation Problem
​There are many hitherto unexplored aspects of the problem of demarcation which worth philosophers' efforts. Traditional approaches generalized from successful theories in physical sciences, e.g., Einstein's theory of General Relativity, and apply the resulting demarcating criterion indiscriminately to all sciences (e.g., Popper applied his criterion to Marxism, Pscho-analysis, Adler Psychology). However, science is a diverse enterprise which consists of a spectrum of disciplines differing in their target problems, range of empirical phenomena, and exemplary practices. They also differ in their methodology. Whilst controlled experiments in laboratory are abundant in natural sciences, they are difficult, if not impossible in most social sciences. How are we to expect our criterion to apply to the social sciences?
​
My recent project on Imre Lakatos (1970) 's methodology of scientific research programmes aim to develop Lakatos's approach to the demarcation problem, drawing on historical case studies in the successful theories and research programmes from social sciences. I also develop approaches which aim to address some technical challenges faced by Lakatos, which will be discussed in my coming presentation.
A photo of professor Imre Lakatos taken in
the 1960s (this photo is licensed under PDM 1.0 deed).
Traditional analysis on knowledge focuses on an epistemic agent's propositional knowledge. Michael Polanyi is considered one of the pioneer on the philosophical explication of tacit knowledge. In his 1966 book The Tacit Dimension, Polanyi sketched an account of tacit knowing by dividing it into four dimensions: functional, semantic, phenomenal, and ontological aspects. Unfortunately, 'tacit knowledge' remains a much conflated and confusing notion, and nowadays few discussion can be found amongst epistemologists.
​
I think that one reason for this is probably because tacit knowledge is very easily conflated with knowledge-how. So we are naturally led into thinking that any philosophical problem regarding tacit knowledge would eventually be reduced to a discussion about know-how and know-that. This is the puzzle for me: what is the relationship between knowledge-how and tacit knowledge? Is the distinction between tacit and non-tacit knowledge reducible to the distinction between knowledge-how and knowledge-that? A preliminary analysis led me to the answer 'No', which I will discuss in more detail in one of my coming presentations...
Analysis of Tacit Knowledge
A photo of professor Michael Polanyi (this photo is licensed under PDM 1.0 deed).